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 Th e Law of Electoral Democracy: 
Th eory and Purpose 
 GRAEME  ORR 
 Th is chapter explores the question of  ‘ theory ’ within the law of electoral democracy, by 
considering what it would mean for such a theory to exist given the contested nature of 
democracy itself. Th e chapter begins with a brief survey of the terms in question, including 
the emergence of this area of law as a fi eld of study and its under-theorised state. It is quickly 
shown that, outside of a narrow and minimalist conception of a free election as one where 
votes are cast and counted, there is little agreement on the norms that should determine the 
law in this area, even on some fundamental concrete questions. 
 Normative coherence however can be demonstrated within competing approaches to 
the law. A social democratic theory of law is seen to provide salutary reminders. Reminders 
that democratic politics is collective more than individualist and that electoral democ-
racy is not the whole of democracy. Within that tradition, the distinctive contribution of 
Keith Ewing to political fi nance  – which he confi gures as party fi nance, and his defence 
of labourism within that  – is discussed. Finally, a four-sided functionalist account of the 
purposes of the law is then off ered. Th e aim of the functionalist account is to show that 
whilst normative approaches may be sharply contested, we are not lost at sea: theory can 
help set the parameters of the ongoing debate over the shape of the law. 
 I. Electoral Law: Its Scope and Intellectual History 
 A. Defi nitions 
 Th e law of electoral democracy encompasses the law and institutions governing representa-
tive elections (at whatever level), political parties, political fi nance and referendums. As a 
commonplace shorthand,  ‘ electoral law ’ will be used in what follows. Occasionally, jostling 
for attention, people have tried on the term  ‘ the law of democracy ’. 1 But that is either too 
grandiose or too diff use. Even to proponents of parliamentarianism and popular sovereignty, 
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electoral democracy may be the pinnacle, but it is just the pinnacle of an iceberg. 2 For 
thoroughgoing social democrats such as Keith Ewing, electoral democracy is nestled within 
a wider constitutional project of economic and social democracy marked by industrial and 
liberation movements. 3 
 By electoral law  ‘ theory ’, I mean primarily to explore questions about  ‘ purpose ’. Purpose 
as telos, in the sense of prescriptive or normative aims. But also, especially later in the 
chapter, purpose in the more descriptive sense of functions of the law. 
 B. A Brief Intellectual History 4 
 It is commonplace to claim that electoral law only emerged as an area of study in its own 
right in the past three decades. But there has been electoral law since time immemorial: in 
statute since at least 1275 in England. 5 And, for all the proliferation of books on electoral law 
lately, across common law domains such as the US, 6 UK, 7 and Australia, 8 the fi eld still pales 
compared to the Victorian era. In the nineetenth century, the Great Reform and electoral 
corruption questions generated more, and more contentious, case law, practitioner works, 
and parliamentary and public interest in reform than exists today. 
 What then does it mean to say that electoral law has emerged as a fi eld in recent decades ? 
Two things are implied. One is about modernity. Th e Victorian era was a long transitional 
moment: representative democracy did not truly take off  until full female suff rage and the 
emergence of strong parties in the fi rst few decades of the twentieth century. Th e other 
implication is that electoral law had to emerge from the shadow of constitutional law. It 
has done so in two senses. In an existential sense: electoral law is not just a dusty prelude 
to parliamentary or legislative studies. And in a methodological sense: electoral law is not 
determined by a few abstract constitutional principles. It has an  ‘ affi  nity with ’ but  ‘ separable 
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and unique character ’ from constitutional law. 9 Elections are steeped in statutory law and 
administration, the aff airs of parties and associations governed by agreements and anti-
discrimination law, and a residue of common and parliamentary law dealing with issues as 
diverse as defamation and disputed election returns. 10 By 2010 a leading US scholar could 
confi dently state that election scholarship had  ‘ declared [its] independence from constitu-
tional law in a bloodless revolution ’. 11 
 C. Th eorising Electoral Law 
 Opening his book  Election Law and Democratic Th eory , David Schultz observed that  ‘ election 
law is an endeavour in search of a political theory ’. 12 Th is echoes Samuel Issacharoff  ’ s quip 
that that the myriad rules that govern elections have  ‘ all the allure of city council debates on 
garbage pick-up routes, with few of the immediately observable benefi ts ’. 13 Issacharoff  was 
being self-deprecating (he has spent half a lifetime immersed in the fi eld). Th e broader point 
is that in an under-theorised realm we risk losing the forest for the trees. 
 Befi tting a political scientist who sees election law as mired in the  ‘ parochialism ’ of  ‘ case 
law and doctrine ’, Schultz seeks to connect a  ‘ rudderless ’ law to democratic theory. 14 Being 
from the US, his account is embedded in a culture that sees electoral law contentions in terms 
of  ‘ the answers provided by the Supreme and other courts ’. 15 Such appellate-courtitis is a 
long-standing feature of a constitutional Bill of Rights and a politicised judiciary. Regardless 
of disciplinary background or national context however, Schultz ’ s broad complaint holds 
water. Th e fi eld of electoral law may have  ‘ declared its independence from constitutional 
law ’, but at the cost of being accused of disintegrating into technicalities. 
 Th e search for overarching, guiding principles however, may prove elusive. We could 
seek to induce a  ‘ theory ’ of election law, from the raw matter of legislative rules, institu-
tional practices and customs, and case law. But there is a morass of such material, and 
even the more prominent sources like appellate court opinions are episodic and confi ned. 
Alternatively (as Schultz suggests) we could seek to deduce principles from democratic 
theory, and see constitutional, statutory and administrative law in the area as nested within 
that crucible of political philosophy. 16 
 Such a deductive process however founders on one inescapable rock. Th ere is no agreed 
or agreeable conception of democracy, or even electoral democracy. To see this one look 
no further than the ideal of  ‘ representation ’, on which representative democracy rests. 
164 Graeme Orr
  17  H  Pitkin ,  Th e Concept of Representation ( Berkeley ,  University of California Press ,  1967 ) .  ‘ Th ere are many views 
of what fair representation is  – geographic representation, descriptive representation, ideological or party politi-
cal representation ’ : Th e ACE Electoral Knowledge Network,  ‘ Electoral Systems: Guiding Principles ’  < aceproject.
org/ace-en/topics/es/introduction/es20 > . Th is is not to say that we cannot chart, historically and sociologically, 
the evolution of diff erent forms of representation: see, eg,  B  Manin ,  Th e Principles of Representative Government 
( New York ,  CUP ,  1997 ) . 
  18  WJM  Mackenzie ,  Free Elections ( London ,  Allen  & Unwin ,  1958 )  12 . 
  19  Mackenzie (n 18) 169. 
  20  KD  Ewing ,  Money, Politics and Law: A Study of Electoral Campaign Finance Reform in Canada ( Oxford ,  OUP , 
 1992 )  v . 
Beyond vaguely tautological, even Heideggerian phrases such as  ‘ representation means 
making present that which is absent ’, all Hannah Pitkin ’ s classic work  Th e Concept of 
Representation could do was reveal the multiple, oft en competing, conceptions of what it 
might mean to be a  ‘ representative ’ in a plural society. 17 
 And indeed, within election studies we fi nd a singular lack of agreed metrics, outside one 
basic aspect. Th at aspect  – the exception to the rule  – involves a fairly minimalist conception 
of the catch-phrase  ‘ free and fair elections ’. As Bill Mackenzie observed, in his ground-
breaking  Free Elections , that term boils down to the principle that  ‘ the election depends on 
the voters ’ choice ’. 18 Elections should consist of a ballot that is tolerably open to a variety of 
candidates or parties, where everyone entitled to vote can do so free of intimidation, and 
all votes are counted. To say this is a technocratic imagining of elections as an  aggregative 
contest, administered impartially, is not to understate its importance. Many countries 
that aspire to democratic status (including parts of the US) struggle with voter suppression, 
polling day chaos and so on. Mackenzie concluded his search for generalisable principles 
with the warning: 
 Th ere is no right way of conducting elections, but there are a number of ways which are clearly 
wrong: wrong in the logical sense that they apply the machinery of elections to negate the declared 
objects of the machinery. 19 
 To adapt a medical metaphor, there is no ideal healthy electoral democracy, rather there are 
many pathologies that may need to be treated in practice. 
 II. A Social Democratic Electoral Law ? 
 Before exploring the interaction of social democratic thought with electoral law we might 
refl ect on its boundaries. Social democracy is not the same as democratic socialism; 
fl ipping the adjective and noun matters. Ewing ’ s second major work on political fi nance 
opens with this breath-catching epigraph: 
 Wealth is almost invariably selfi sh and lacking in moral principle. Its interests are oft en 
 diametrically opposed to sound public policy. 20 
 Th is could be a cri de coeur of democratic socialism. It goes beyond the standard process-
focused view that wealth in elections needs regulating lest it corrode democratic process 
by tilting campaigns and legislators against the egalitarian spirit of one person, one-vote. 
It expresses a deeper substantive aversion to the interests of wealth per se. 
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 Social democracy on the other hand is a less demanding philosophy than democratic 
socialism. (Compare John Rawls vacillating between  ‘ market socialism ’ and  ‘ property-
owning democracy ’ in his fi nal  ‘ restatement ’ of his theory of justice). 21 Whilst lacking 
democratic socialism ’ s concern for equality of outcomes, it goes beyond the welfare liberal ’ s 
concern with enhancing equal opportunity of individuals. Social democrats thus share with 
democratic socialists a distaste for liberalism ’ s reduction of the world to individuals. 22 Th ey 
recognise that humans are embedded in groups and that the social whole is not blindly 
evolving through competitive forces but is a vehicle for enhancing the common good. 
Admittedly, the forms of human fl ourishing are diverse, so that there is not a single concep-
tion of  ‘ the good life ’. Yet, regardless of whether  ‘ democracy ’ is used adjectively or as a noun, 
the two philosophies share a creed: electoral democracy must seek to underpin forms of 
representative practice that recognise the connectedness and equal worth of everyone. 23 
 A. Purpose as Norms: Concretising the Search for Guiding 
Principles 
 To fl esh out the quest for electoral law theory, we need to concretise the topic. To do this, 
let us briefl y consider three basic and perennial questions in electoral democracy. Th ese are: 
the franchise, in the sense (a) who votes, and (b) what a vote is worth; plus (c) the voting 
system. I have chosen these as they are fi rst order issues of the sort that are oft en thought to 
have been defi nitively settled a century ago. But, as we shall see, they are in signifi cant part 
still normatively open and contested. 
 i. Who Votes 
 It ’ s now an axiomatic principle of liberal democracy that that the suff rage should be 
 universal. Of course it has not always been that way: chartists and other social democrats 
had to win that battle in the nineteenth century against conservative forces. Th e latter feared 
 ‘ ir ’ responsible government if the economically dependent (workers, women) had the same 
franchise as propertied men. But the battle was eventually won, with most women fi nally 
gaining a vote in the UK a century ago. 24 
 Yet as to what  ‘ universal ’ means in practice, there remain disagreements. Should citi-
zens resident abroad vote, or should non-citizen permanent residents vote ? Here there is 
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fundamental disagreement. To social democrats, there is a preferred answer.  ‘ No ’ to expa-
triate voting, but yes to permanent residents. 25 Th is fl ows from the progressive idea of 
substantive interests, over liberal valorising of citizenship per se or a conservative idea of 
birthrights. 26 
 So far, so good. Th ere is in-principle agreement on the universality of the franchise, and 
a social democratic position on citizenship versus residency. But what of the obvious next 
question: is voting to be voluntary, or compulsory ? Here, one might think social demo-
crats would embrace compulsion. Compulsory turnout is a shibboleth of the centre-left  
in Australia, and compulsory enrolment likewise in New Zealand. Compulsion seeks to 
maximise voice and it may nudge policy towards more substantively egalitarian outcomes, 
say its proponents. 27 Yet such rules have not spread to other common law democracies. In 
the UK, compulsory turnout attracted some support from within the Labour Government 
in the mid-2000s, leading to a Ministry of Justice green paper canvassing a statutory  ‘ duty ’ 
to vote but without any sanctions to enforce it. 28 But the proposal went nowhere. Of course 
inertia favours the status quo, but compulsory voting is a classic example of a fundamental 
issue where liberty and equality norms collide intractably. 
 ii. Th e  ‘ Weight ’ of Each Vote 
 One-vote, one-value may seem to be a no-brainer today, as a correlative of a universal fran-
chise. And yet  … witness its long absence from the distribution of seats in Westminster, and 
the limited interest of social democrats in implementing it. It would be too easy to suggest 
that allowing smaller enrolments for  ‘ regional ’ seats in the UK is a partisan redoubt (Labour 
being historically stronger in Wales and Scotland than the epicentre of southern England). 
Th ere are principles at play as well. In contrast, for American progressives the fi ght has all 
been the other way. In  ‘ easily the most important case in the [US] law of politics canon ’, 29 
they won a strict one-vote, one-value rule by convincing the Supreme Court to imply it from 
the Bill of Rights and the  ‘ equal protection of the laws ’. 30 
 Th ere are counter-arguments, from a diff erent view of representation, that votes need 
not be weighted equally if power and wealth is disproportionately centred in one region. 
Take London and the  ‘ home ’ counties of England, within the UK. Devolution may help 
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redress the power imbalance amongst the nations of the UK, but the south of England 
remains wealthier than regions adjusting to the post-industrial economy, key constitu-
encies for Labour ’ s socio-economic project. One-vote, one-value is more than a mere a 
 ‘ slogan or political catchcry ’ (as it was once dismissed by an Australian Chief Justice); 31 
however it is not a universal principle. At diff erent times and places conservatives  and 
social democrats have recognised that equity of treatment and voice is not always the 
same as mathematical equality of votes. Does this suggest agreement over an underly-
ing  principle of substantive equality ? Not necessarily. But what it does reveal is that even 
within an ideal like  ‘ political equality ’, diff erent notions of  ‘ equality ’ exhibit strong tension. 
 iii. Th e Voting System 
 Here, there are a smorgasbord of models, each with profound diff erences for the degree 
of electoral choice and for the make-up of parliaments and government. To name just the 
three most prominent clusters of options in use, there are forms of proportional representa-
tion (PR), majoritarian run-off s (including the preferential or alternative vote (AV)), and 
the old stand-by of fi rst-past-the-post or plurality voting. Even in countries with similar 
Westminster lower houses, common law and party systems, the room for principled diff er-
ence is profound. 
 Given the chance in a referendum in 2010, the British Labour Party declined to embrace 
AV. Part of its reason was a preference for strong, responsible party government, an arte-
fact of a view of popular sovereignty that is wary of bicameralism let alone coalition 
government. 32 Labour prefers to take its chances on the bipolar pendulum rather than risk 
further fracturing of the left -of-centre vote. Preferential voting, aft er all, was a system intro-
duced in Australia to diminish the eff ect of any split in the conservative vote between parties 
of the right. But it is an article of faith on the left  in Australia. Australia ’ s most progressive 
Prime Minister since WW2 even went as far as to praise optional preferential voting, as the 
one system that allows electors to express indiff erence to options on the ballot. 33 Further 
abroad, in much of continental Europe, PR is seen as a necessary social democratic posi-
tion, expressing the diversity principle of representation and refl ecting a sense of the value 
of multi-party jostling and co-operation. 
 III. Political Finance: A Search for Norms 
 Th e most pressing electoral law question, for some decades, has been money in electoral 
politics. 34 Th is is the case across the  ‘ developed ’ democracies. Th e area has proved febrile 
as regulators, legislators and courts shift  between liberal, via egalitarian then onto integrity 
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positions, and back again. Here, then, is an area where we can divine no overarching theory 
or set of nested principles to direct regulation. 
 It is nigh on impossible to imagine consensus on aims between those who see  democracy 
as about individual expression and those who see it as protecting collective interests, as the 
endless US debate makes clear. Perhaps this is unsurprising. As Anika Gauja explained in 
her search for international norms on the regulation of political parties: 
 signifi cant normative disagreements exist surrounding the desirability of parties as electoral actors, 
qualifi cations upon freedoms of association, the extent to which parties should be supported by 
the state, the nature of party competition, and the extent to which equality interferes with the 
freedoms of political expression and association (and vice versa). 35 
 Her conclusion was that outside some quite minimal liberal principles  – parties have a right 
to exist to contest elections  – the search for consensus was fruitless. 36 Instead,  ‘ [d] etermining 
and defi ning the parameters of the debate, rather than advocating for a universal policy 
solution ’ was the role for any theoretical systematisation. 37 In similar fashion, International 
IDEA has avoided trying to defi ne a theory for political fi nance regulation, since  ‘ there is no 
form of democratic governance that is preferred everywhere ’. 38 At best there are broad but 
competing goals that may express themselves diff erently in diff erent political systems and 
contexts. 
 But can we diagnose a core, social democratic position on regulating money in electoral 
politics ? We can, although it is partial rather than holistic and more an axiomatic tendency 
than a manifesto. Th is approach is guided by the sentiment, expressed by Ewing (above), 
that wealth in itself is corrosive of democracy. Money and monied interests put at risk the 
social democratic (and democratic socialist) promise of electoral democracy  – equal respect 
and voice. To the social democrat the value of electoral democracy is as a counterbalance to 
a marketplace which, for all its dynamism and effi  ciency, is not built on humane values and 
reinscribes social and economic inequality 
 A.  ‘ Party Finance ’ : Th e Distinctive Ewingian Focus 39 
 Political fi nance is the area of electoral law in which Keith Ewing has made his greatest 
contribution. It is no exaggeration to say he has been the most prolifi c and infl uential 
scholar in this area in the common law world beyond the US. His dedicated books include 
three research monographs and four edited volumes. Whilst his monographs focus on the 
Th e Law of Electoral Democracy: Th eory and Purpose 169
  40  Ewing,  Th e Funding of Political Parties in Britain (n 21), Ewing,  Money, Politics, and Law (n 20) and Ewing,  Th e 
Cost of Democracy (n 7). 
  41  KD  Ewing (ed),  Th e Funding of Political Parties:  Europe and Beyond ( Bologna ,  CLUEB ,  1999 ) ,  KD  Ewing 
and  NS  Ghaleigh (eds),  Th e Challenge of Party Political Funding:  Comparative Perspectives ( Bologna ,  CLUEB , 
 2001 ) ,  KD  Ewing and  S  Issacharoff  (eds),  Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective 
( Oxford ,  Hart Publishing ,  2006 ) and  KD  Ewing ,  J  Rowbottom and  J  Th am (eds),  Th e Funding of Political Parties: 
 Where Now ? ( Abingdon ,  Routledge ,  2012 ) . 
  42  ‘ We begin with the party  … ’ : Ewing,  ‘ Jeremy Corbyn and the Law of Democracy ’ (n 3) 347 and following. 
  43  K  Ewing ,  ‘ Political Party Finance :  Th emes in International Context ’ in  J  Th am et al (eds),  Electoral Democracy: 
 Australian Prospects ( Melbourne ,  MUP ,  2011 )  143 . 
  44  Ewing,  ‘ Political Party Finance: Th emes in International Context ’ (n 43) 147 – 49. 
  45  Indeed under the headings  ‘ institutional accountability ’ (of parties and donors) and  ‘ fair rivalry ’ they were the 
heart of Ewing ’ s analysis at the conclusion of  Th e Funding of Political Parties in Britain (n 21) 178 – 87. 
  46  See  KD  Ewing and  W  Finnie ,  Civil Liberties in Scotland:  Cases and Materials , 2nd edn ( Edinburgh ,  W Green  & 
Son ,  1988 ) ,  K  Ewing and  C  Gearty ,  Freedom under Th atcher:  Civil Liberties in Modern Britain ( Oxford ,  OUP ,  1990 ) , 
 K  Ewing and  C  Gearty ,  Th e Struggle for Civil Liberties:  Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain, 1914 – 1945 
( Oxford ,  OUP ,  2001 ) , and  KD  Ewing ,  Bonfi re of the Liberties:  New Labour, Human Rights and the Rule of Law 
( Oxford ,  OUP ,  2010 ) especially ch 4 of the latter on  ‘ Freedom of Assembly and the Right of Public Protest ’. 
UK and Canada, 40 his edited works span Europe, north America and Australasia. 41 Here, 
by way of sample, are the essential elements of their titles:  ‘ Th e Funding of Political Parties 
in Britain ’,  ‘ Th e Funding of Political Parties: Europe and Beyond ’,  ‘ Th e Challenge of Party 
Political Funding ’,  ‘ Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective ’, 
 ‘ Party Funding in Modern British Politics ’,  ‘ Th e Funding of Political Parties ’. 
 One thing shines from that list. In Ewing ’ s framing, what others label  ‘ political fi nance ’ 
or  ‘ campaign fi nance ’ is, at root, a question of the fair and proper funding of  political parties . 
Th is emphasis on party is pragmatically rooted in the idea of responsible party government. 
It would make less sense in a country like the US, with its directly elected chief executives 
and its candidate-centred primary elections. But it is also expresses an ideological variant 
of social democracy. 42 
 Ewing ’ s  ‘ Political Party Finance  – Th emes in International Context ’ is instructive here. 43 
It is not just a neat summation of the value of his  ‘ party fi nance ’ orientation, it is as close to a 
generalised statement about the norms that ought shape, and methods that might manage, 
the regulation of money in politics, as anyone has given anywhere. On the all important 
normative side, Ewing lists three  ‘ guiding principles ’ : 
 Th e fi rst concern  … is the need to ensure that parties have adequate funding.  … Th e second 
concern is  … to ensure that this occurs by means that do not expose them to the dangers of 
corruption and confl ict of interest.  … Th e third concern [is that] we need also to ensure there is 
fair competition between them. 44 
 Th e last two concerns are familiar. 45 Anti-corruption or integrity concerns are shared even 
by a body as liberal as the US Supreme Court.  ‘ Fair competition ’ can be parsed as a parity 
of arms conception of equality, where the focus of the parity is between parties as the chief 
agents within modern parliamentary government. Where, a liberal might ask, is  ‘ liberty ’, 
the concern for electoral and expressive freedoms ? Is its literal absence some blindness or 
malevolence on the part of social democracy ? Th at would be odd, as the championing of 
civil liberties  – including freedoms of political protest  – in another strand of Ewing ’ s work 
can attest. 46 Rather, Ewing ’ s concern is not with individual electoral freedoms in the abstract. 
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It is with the ability for parties, as the collective voice of diff erent interests, to participate in 
a roughly fair competition. 
 Having laid down three guiding  ‘ principles ’, Ewing addresses the question  ‘ how can we 
implement these principles ? ’ He off ers  ‘ no single bullet ’, but a  ‘ menu ’ of  ‘ three dishes ’ : 
 Th e starter is transparency, which is now fully recognised as [a] prerequisite  … Th e main course 
[consists of] contribution caps or spending limits.  … [T]he sweet course [is] in the form of public 
or state funding. 47 
 Th is summation of principles isn ’ t just the work of a mature systematiser: it was echoed 
20 years earlier in Ewing ’ s book on Canadian political fi nance. (Th e one work, perhaps 
because it had a more north American audience, or perhaps because Canada was even then 
beginning to look at third parties, where the organising term was not  ‘ party fi nance ’.) In 
that book, we learn that  ‘ the case for control [of money in politics] starts with the principle 
of political equality  … at the heart of the system of government in the liberal democratic 
tradition ’. 48 
 Th is overarching principle  – which is social democratic rather than liberal democratic, 
unless  ‘ liberal ’ is infl ected with a north American accent  – itself comprises two foci. One 
on fair competition or  ‘ the right of equal opportunity to secure election ’ ; the other on  ‘ equal 
representation ’. 49 Th e fair competition or campaign principle involves ensuring three things. 
First that  ‘ each of the candidates or parties representing major strands of opinion should 
have enough money to eff ectively fi ght an election [and] maintain an organization between 
elections ’. (Note how candidates are mentioned, but the focus is still on parties as collective, 
organized interests). Second, that these players should  ‘ have access to the major instruments 
of communication ’ (essentially the media). And third that  ‘ no party or candidate should be 
permitted to spend more than its rivals by a disproportionate amount ’ (ie spending limits). 50 
 Th e equal representation principle, for its part, combines integrity and fair government 
concerns. Again, Ewing breaks this down into a triad. First, electors should be encouraged 
to contribute, to reduce dependency on big donors (this is a nod to Canada ’ s attempt to use 
tax credits to encourage small, citizen donations). Second, those who contribute should be 
accountable. In this, disclosure is key. Th ird,  ‘ the infl uence of the economically powerful 
should be restricted by controlling the amount of money they contribute ’. Th is seems to 
point to caps on donations. But, as we shall now see, donations by corporations and the rich 
are in the sights, rather than contributions from civil society groups like unions. 51 
 B. Supply, Demand and Trade Union Money in Politics 
 Earlier we noted that, unlike classical liberals or libertarians, social democrats are 
concerned to restrain money in politics and to do this by law, rather than leave it to ethics or 
custom. Indeed, this might be a sine qua non or litmus test for social (electoral) democracy. 
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But a desire to restrain money is a vague principle, not a regulatory scheme. Amongst social 
democratic positions there are those, like Ewing, who focus on the demand side; that is, 
on expenditure limits. Th en there are those who focus on the supply side; that is, on dona-
tion limits. Th e supply-siders include US progressives who, for over a century, have been 
concerned with busting the power of big corporations and cartels, and countervailing it 
with citizen-based action and contributions. 
 Th ese diff erent approaches can, in part, be rationalised as forms of path dependency, 
driven by concerns rooted in diff ering times and contexts. As early as 1883, the UK initi-
ated expenditure limits  – then on candidates  – with good reason. Th e initiative was part of a 
wider war on electoral corruption, then emblemised by outright electoral bribery. In tamp-
ing down on expenditure, a broader aim was to relieve pressure on existing MPs and parties 
by reducing the arms ’ race. A happy by-product of this was making electoral contests more 
accessible to less well-to-do candidates. In contrast, under the pervasive infl uence of First 
Amendment doctrine and values, the concern in the US was to avoid industrial strength 
 ‘ purchasing ’ of infl uence over legislators or directly elected executives. To this day, the UK 
has expenditure limits, but not donation caps; the US has the reverse. 
 Besides these factors, there have also been pragmatic arguments about the enforce-
ability of donations limits and expenditure limits. Donations occur in private, and so are 
harder to monitor than campaign publicity, which rivals and regulators can monitor. 52 Th is 
administrative insight is, however, becoming less convincing as campaigning moves into the 
dark arts of targeted, online advocacy, including e-campaigning contracted via companies 
located off shore. 53 Money is fl uid and slippery, whether being given or spent. 
 Beyond these national contexts and enforceability factors, there is a deeper question for 
social democrats. To the likes of Ewing, social democracy still very much means mobilis-
ing collective interests. Th is has chiefl y been through labourism and a parliamentary party 
tied to the labour movement. 54 It follows then that social democracy may shoot itself in the 
foot if it caps all donations, since unions ensure the Labour Party survives during droughts 
in opposition and keep it tethered to its roots. Consistent with this vision, other scholars 
like Joo-Cheong Th am and Jacob Rowbottom  – who Ewing has mentored  – have argued in 
detail that the participatory and collective nature of unions distinguish them from business 
groups and for-profi t corporations when it comes to making political contributions. 55 Th is 
is not to say that dependence on institutional donations (say from a small number of big 
unions) is not a risk: 30 years ago Ewing recognised the importance of transparency and 
membership approval of such contributions. But, in practice, that risk has reduced since 
the advent of a more corporate-friendly Labour Party in the last 20 years. 56 Above all, for 
Ewing, any signifi cant cap on union contributions would be a deprivation of freedom of 
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association. Not just in a practical sense by denying a key funding source but by rendering 
 ‘ unlawful the existing constitutional structure of the Labour Party ’. 57 
 We should pause here, to note how Kahn-Freund ’ s ideal of collective laissez-faire in 
labour relations has resonance for action in the electoral arena, where a self-reliant labour/
Labour movement is pitted against more conservative antagonists. 58 Th is realisation can 
explain not just the rejection of supply-side, donation caps by British Labour, but also their 
absence in NZ and most of Australia. 59 Conversely, where parties of the centre-left  are less 
enmeshed with the labour movement, as in Canada and the US, donation caps covering all 
types of donors (for-profi t corporations, unions and other groups, and individuals alike) 
are staples of the regulatory menu. Th e idea of collective self-reliance can also explain why 
state support for political parties has not been a focus of social democratic reformers in 
the UK, 60 the way it has in Australia and continental Europe. In parts of those more statist 
jurisdictions, the bulk of party electioneering and even administrative costs are met from 
public funds. 61 
 IV. Purpose as Function 
 So far, I have described the problems inherent in seeking to theorise any coherent, singular 
set of purposes for electoral law, where purpose is understood as normative aims. Th ere is, 
of course, another way of understanding purpose, as function. Here I want to briefl y sketch, 
and recommend, a functionalist conspectus of electoral law theories. 
 Th ere are various functionalist approaches to law. Th e best known is Karl Llewellyn ’ s 
 ‘ law jobs ’ theory. 62 Llewellyn ’ s concern was with the  ‘ how ’ of law, which he dubbed  ‘ juristic 
method ’. 63 To him, the ultimate  ‘ why ’ of the law revolved around settling disputes without 
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repressing human creativity or fl ourishing. In mentioning Llewellyn in a discussion of elec-
tion law, I don ’ t mean to invoke his concepts of juristic method or dispute settlement. As 
we saw at the start of this chapter, electoral law is not predominantly about litigation or the 
negotiation of confl ict under the umbrella of the law. On the contrary, as a key element in 
the ordering of the political domain, it is a  precursor to government and hence law-making 
and dispute resolution on substantive issues. Rather, I mean to invoke the simpler insight 
that the  ‘ purpose ’ of a domain like electoral law can be considered in terms of the functions 
it might fulfi l or fail to fulfi l. 
 Here, in diagrammatic form, is my functionalist mapping of election law theory. 
Space precludes a lengthy summary, 64 but I will briefl y explain the layout and grouping of 
concepts in turn. 
 Figure 9.1 A Typology of Election Law Th eories 
 
• Elections as mask
• Substanceless 
process
















 Th e top half of the diagram identifi es the two most common, and instrumental, approaches 
to election law. Th e  ‘ structural integrity ’ theme, at root, is captured in the old saying about 
electoral democracy being the least worst system of government. Th is conception is devel-
oped in Joseph Schumpeter ’ s  ‘ realist ’ account of electoral democracy as a realm of elites. 65 
Th is is not an empty metaphor of politics as a mere mechanism to populate legislatures. 66 
It encompasses the goal of fair elections in the fundamental sense of counting all the votes, 
and applying rules of the contest impartially. Independent electoral administration and 
law enforcement are critical, lest  ‘ regulation [become] public deception ’. 67 Ultimately it 
also encompasses elections as a crude accountability mechanism, where governments and 
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legislators are opened up to regular electoral judgment. In this conception, voting boils down 
to hiring and fi ring decisions as candidates and parties seek to gain or renew a mandate. 68 
 Th is will still feel like a minimalist conception. To say our rulers are answerable to  ‘ the 
people ’, rather than God, family or oligarchical backers, is a negative rule rather than a model 
of representation. But, in the course of human history, the ability to turnover those in power, 
bloodlessly yet without limiting the rulers to a bloodline, has proven a precious thing. Th is 
conception also then speaks to a variety of regulatory questions: stressing the importance of 
independent electoral authorities, access to the ballot and ballot box, the regularity of elec-
tions and laws to minimise the risk of quid quo pro corruption. 
 Th e top right of the diagram, in contrast, captures the more questing aims of electoral law 
in most democratic traditions. 69 Th ese include the prominent normative purposes discussed 
earlier: political liberty and political equality. Without these two wings the bird won ’ t fl y. But 
there is tension not only between those two purposes, but within them. Th ere are diff erent 
approaches to liberty (collective or individual), and to equality (formal or substantive, and 
party, interest group or candidate centred). Th ere are also other liberal values which have 
tended to be sublimated. Th e most obvious is good deliberation: to what extent can electoral 
law and processes improve the quality of debate and information ? 70 Realists, for their part, 
do not reject these values but see them as  ‘ romantic ’,  ‘ folk theories ’ that can obscure as much 
as they limit the power of elites. 71 
 Th ese two approaches  – the structural integrity and the liberal democratic  – both 
express several teleological aims. Unsurprisingly, they have played an explicit role in shap-
ing the law. But there is a third view which sees electoral democracy as, in a sense, an 
end in itself. Th is, as I ’ ve explained elsewhere, is the conception of elections as rituals. 72 
Not rituals in the empty sense, but in the everyday sense in which any patterned, recurrent 
and meaningful human activity is lived out. In this more sociological approach, however we 
stage elections under law we should be cognisant of the symbols and experiences that are 
generated. Should we, for instance, vote in schools or government buildings, and on a single 
polling day or across weeks ? Th ese questions can be analysed in terms of instrumental goals 
(maximising turnout for the sake of legitimacy and participation). But they also need to be 
understood as choices that shape the social experience and understanding of an election as 
the one occasion that truly brings together a secular society. 
 Finally, in the bottom right quadrant, lies the realm of the deep sceptic. In this view, 
elections are just a game, in the hollow sense of the word. Th is approach diff ers from 
the other three, which each assume a commitment to the enterprise, whilst diff ering in 
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their portrayal of the  ‘ jobs ’ that elections perform. By contrast, in the  ‘ it ’ s a game ’ view, 
paying too much heed to building good electoral institutions and laws risks obscuring the 
possibility that elections function as a mask. Th is sentiment is most easily distilled in the 
catchcries  ‘ whoever you vote for a politician always wins ’ and  ‘ if voting changed anything, 
it would be illegal ’. Variants of those slogans have been attributed to everyone from politi-
cal activists to the literary wag Mark Twain. Long usage of such sayings, without obvious 
source, attest to their popularity. Less cynical are critiques that nuance satirical detachment 
with commitment to alternatives to liberal democracy. Most obviously are Marxism and 
 anarchism. Emblematic of this is Emma Goldman ’ s essay doubting the value of suff ragism: 
 ‘ Our modern fetich [sic] is universal suff rage.  … Woe to the heretic who dare question that 
 divinity! ’ 73 Market-oriented libertarians, also deeply sceptical of government, sometimes 
also echo this view. 
 Th ere is even a related strand of neo-conservative thought, which doubts the value of 
elections precisely because electoral law is concerned with (hollow) proceduralism. Th us, 
in Irving Kristol ’ s account, elections are games that we manage in the name of legitimising 
a self-perpetuating system: 
 Democracy is a  “ political system ”  … reduced to its mechanical arrangements  … nothing but a set 
of rules and procedures whereby majority rule and minority rights are reconciled. 74 
 In other words, liberal electoral democracy lacks a conception of the good, or any sense of 
virtue or character, values required to avoid politics becoming the terrain of self-serving 
apparatchiks. Democratic socialists would not completely disagree. Aft er all, equal dignity 
and respect are hardly to be achieved if electoral democracy boils down to a utilitarian 
calculus where everyone votes in their own interest. If that happens, electoral outcomes 
may be procedurally utilitarian, but substantively unfair for vast numbers. Ultimately, 
the outsider critique of elections as a game is of little use to regulators. But it serves as 
a reminder that democracy cannot be reduced to the rules of electoral democracy. To a 
social democrat, industrial democracy for instance is no less a constitutional value than 
parliamentary democracy. 
 V. In Conclusion 
 To explore any area of law in the hope of fi nding a  ‘ theory ’ for it, in the sense of a set of 
guiding principles, is heroic. At a generous level of generality, some regulatory domains 
can be captured in a succinct set of aims in search of a balance. So environmental law has a 
grundnorm of sustainability, within which it juggles deep-green or precautionary principles 
with approaches which give more weight to human demands. Th e essence of taxation law 
can be captured in the need to collect public revenues to address social aims like redistribu-
tion and promoting desirable activity, without strangling economic incentive. Labour law, 
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for its part, has existed in a state of perpetual tension between its governing ideal of protect-
ing employees and wider economic forces. In recent times its scope has been stretched, 
almost unrecognisably, into an inter-connected  ‘ law of work ’, paid and unpaid. 75 (Others in 
this volume will seek to redefi ne a protective and social democratic vocation for labour law 
amongst the complexities of twenty-fi rst century.) 
 Why then can ’ t a seemingly niche domain like electoral law be so neatly contained ? We 
began by noting that electoral law has been under-theorised, and asking if it were possible 
to synthesise a set of normative purposes to guide it. Th e answer is  ‘ perhaps ’ : try political 
liberty, equality and deliberation. But the tension between those norms is oft en irreconcil-
able and, expressed with such generality, concepts like political  ‘ liberty ’ and  ‘ equality ’ are 
indeterminate. Ultimately, the contested nature of representative democracy ensures we will 
struggle to fi nd any nested set of normative guidelines to guide electoral law. Th is is the 
case even allowing for diff erent political contexts. Yes, principles may express themselves in 
diff erent answers to the same question across diff erent historical and social contexts (hence 
shift s in the minimum voting age for instance). But context cannot explain away more basic 
diff erences (say over voluntary versus compulsory voting, or over the role of money in 
politics). 
 All is not normative randomness however. Social democrats share a conception of elec-
toral democracy that can guide reform in that mould  – even allowing that, within social 
democratic theory, we see distinctive infl ections of the principle of social equality and the 
collective nature of society. A good example of that is Ewing ’ s work on money in politics, 
with its framing of the law around  ‘ party funding ’, recognising the desirability of a certain 
parliamentary and party system and emphasising labourism. 
 Electoral law is special in that it is constitutive, of the politics and governments that in 
turn create law in other, more substantive domains. 
 Th e key insight of election law is that laws regulating the political process are not  “ neutral ”  … 
Politics is therefore a  “ game ”  – not in the sense that its outcomes are trivial, but in a sense that the 
winners and losers are determined by the strategic decisions and actions taken within  … a system 
of rules. Election law is about the creation and implementation of those rules. 76 
 To social democrats and conservatives alike, this is not something to be lamented. Th e 
design of the law is less a search for platonic ideals and more a contest of values and 
 worldviews. In other words, there is no  ‘ theory ’ ; rather there is a variety of clashing, norma-
tive  theories. Ewing ’ s contribution stands unashamedly in this tradition. He advances a 
particular, pragmatic version of a social democratic view of politics and constitutionalism. 
As Jacob Rowbottom observes, his approach is  ‘ consistent with social democratic values ’ 
in seeking  ‘ to ensure that political rights can be exercised in practice and are not depend-
ent on levels of wealth ’ but  ‘ does not seek to re-design the system [but rather] defends the 
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existing institutions as providing a rough approximation to an inclusive system that best fi ts 
[his country ’ s] political history. ’ 77 
 To appreciate that there is not overarching  ‘ theory ’ of electoral law does not, however, 
condemn us to conceptual chaos. In a contested domain like electoral law, theory can play 
a systematic role by setting a framework for debate. Th e value of this approach is to set 
parameters for discussion and to help frame syntheses, critiques or reform proposals about 
the law, both in academia and policy-making. Th is is where a functionalist typology, like 
the one I have off ered, fi ts in. Being taxonomic, a functional approach need not weigh-
in on normative disputes between diff erent social democratic or libertarian traditions. Its 
weakness is that its dispassion can seem rudderless or anti-theoretical, like the  ‘ garbage 
can ’ theory of mixed or pluralist jurisprudence. 78 But without some parameters, debates are 
likely to become blinded to the variety of questions in play, or worse, mired in particularities 
and pure partisanship. 
 

